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Introduction 
Identifying who moves in and out of poverty over time has been the focus of a growing literature on 
household level poverty dynamics. A central theme of this literature has been the role of shocks and 
their impact on households ex ante and ex post risk management strategies. Shocks and strategies to 
mitigate their impact affect household level welfare dynamics. Success or failure to prevent and to deal 
with shocks determines whether households are able to escape and remain out of poverty or whether 
they continue to be or become poor as a result of adverse events. In turn, this success and failure is 
determined by households ability to access effective insurance mechanisms, both formal and informal. 
The more effective and accessible these mechanisms are the greater is the chance to recover from 
negative shocks and to improve well-being over time. Conversely, households with limited access to any 
type of insurance mechanism will find it harder to weather shocks and avoid chronic poverty. 
From a policy perspective and to identify how to improve access and effectiveness of mechanisms that 
households can use to manage risk we need to distinguish between the two different types of risk that 
households are exposed to. Covariate risk such as drought, rainfall, pests or civil war affect the entire 
population. As a consequence efforts to deal with covariate risk have to look beyond the geographic 
location or population and focus on risk pooling across larger areas and populations. Covariate risks 
have been the focus of much of the existing literature (Rosenzweig 1988; Hoddinott and Kinsey 2001; 
Dercon 2004; Newhouse 2005; Alderman et al. 2006; Hoddinott forthcoming).   
Despite the predominant focus in the welfare dynamics literature on covariate risk evidence suggests 
that idiosyncratic risk often dominates covariate risk. Townsend (1994) finds this in rural India. Deaton’s 
(1997) and Kazianga and Udry’s (2006) results corroborate this for South Africa and Burkina Faso. 
Lybbert et al. (2004) find that this even holds among pastoralists in southern Ethiopia, a population that 
is subject to highly covariate rain, epidemiological and range ecological shocks. Similarly, our survey and 
focus groups from rural Ghana suggest that covariate shocks were few during the study period 1997 to 
2009 but indicated numerous household-specific shocks. 
Unlike covariate risk exposure to idiosyncratic shocks can be insured against within a population or 
location. The largely unanswered empirical question that remains is which types of local insurance 
mechanisms are available and which one are effective in mitigating exposure to idiosyncratic risk and 
shocks. One key contribution of our paper is, therefore, to focus on household-specific risk and its 
impact on household level welfare dynamics. The main questions we address in this paper is how 
idiosyncratic shocks affect welfare dynamics paths and whether those effects are mitigated differentially 
by different risk management strategies. 
Facing uninsured risk ex ante and being forced to cope with consequences of risk ex post households 
employ a range of strategies to minimize their exposure to risk and to smooth their consumption over 
time. Autarkic households might be able to self-insure through savings and precautionary savings. 
Others may have access to other risk management strategies such as informal and formal insurance and 
credit, social networks, and labor market access and income diversification. Existing studies focus on any 
one of these insurance mechanisms.  
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Given access to insurance mechanisms households maximize their welfare by smoothing their 
consumption over time. Insurance can come from a variety of sources: self insurance and asset 
accumulation through own savings (Dercon 1998; Kazianga and Udry 2006), selling buffer stocks (Lim 
and Townsend 1998), pre-cautionary savings (Kimball 1990; Carroll 1998), or through selling assets and 
livestock. However, households typically cannot fully insure against fluctuations in income. Hence, they 
are forced to adopt coping strategies that reduce their welfare temporarily or permanently, for instance, 
by selling off important productive assets such as bullocks in India (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993), taking 
children out of school or by having to drop their food consumption to levels that cause irreversible 
damage to children’s growth and development (Alderman et al. 2006). 
Social networks provide another mechanism to mitigate the effect of idiosyncratic shocks. Social 
visibility can affect welfare dynamics in at least six ways. It can prevent asset decumulation post shock, 
mitigate the need for precautionary, liquid savings for self-insurance, foster productivity through ex ante 
risk management, improve social learning about promising employment, marketing or technological 
opportunities, enhance the security of land tenure, and facilitate access to micro credit based on group 
lending principles.  Through any or all of these mechanisms, social visibility may affect the asset 
accumulation path followed by households by increasing the expected net returns to assets, reducing 
asset risk, or both. Vanderpuye-Orgle and Barrett (2009) examine the importance of social networks in 
managing risk for households in rural Ghana. They  find that those who are socially invisible and who 
suffer a farm shock or theft - idiosyncratic shocks that are informally insured among the socially visible - 
are considerably more likely to fall into a poverty trap than are otherwise identical persons who do not 
suffer shocks or who are socially visible. 
 
Diversification of income sources represents another informal mechanism to insure against risk. Where 
formal insurance access is limited, as is the case in most rural areas, income diversification is the norm 
rather than the exception (Reardon 1997, Davis et al. 2010 ). The reasons for households to diversify 
their income are multiple. For some households diversification may be driven by necessity and to ensure 
survival. The expected return to a diversified portfolio of low-return crops may be lower than for a single 
high-risk and higher return crop but when other types of insurance mechanisms are weak household 
may choose the former. Or households may be forced to enter other income generating activities as a 
consequence of negative shocks. In contrast, other, typically better-off households may be prompted to 
diversify out of choice either by trying to get the highest return to their investment by combining several 
high-return activities, or in order to strategically accumulate assets as they move from farm to non-farm 
activities and as they prepare to and then migrate to cities (Ellis 1998, 2000a and 2000b, and Barrett et 
al. 2001).  
 
Our paper goes beyond the existing studies by examining each of these risk management strategies 
individually as well as jointly. This allows us to both assess the relative importance of these mechanisms 
as well as identify complementarities between them. This extension beyond an individual risk 
management mechanism allows a more appropriate modeling of the behavior of households that face 
risk as when one or more risk management mechanisms are unavailable households resort to other 
mechanisms. Evidence from rural Pakistan, for example, suggests that interpersonal transfers partially 
make up for missing access to formal financial institutions (Behrman et al. 1997). 4 
 
Context: The four villages 1998-2009 
The four communities studied in this paper are located in Akwapim South district, a hilly rural area in 
southern Ghana. The study area is less than 30 miles from Ghana’s capital city, Accra, but too far for 
community members to regularly commute for work. The four communities are large villages, or 
clusters of smaller villages, with estimated populations of between 700 and 2,500. They were selected in 
1997-98 for a study of farmers’ decisions to start pineapple farming for export. Two of the communities 
lie on sealed roads and close to small towns, while the others are in a remote valley on unsealed roads. 
Since the communities were selected purposively to provide a representation of the range of economic 
conditions in the district, their economic and social characteristics are quite different. Nevertheless, all 
four communities are within the same geographic region and climatic zone, have a common history, and 
share the same markets. 
The patterns of employment and economic activity in the communities align closely with their 
geographic characteristics. In the two remote communities, most households are employed in farming. 
Some of this farming is commercial, the bulk of which is growing pineapple for export or domestic 
processing. Most of the remaining produce grown is consumed within the household, with any surpluses 
being sold on the street or in town markets. In the other two communities, there are fewer farmers and 
more wage workers. Some of these are employed by the government and local businesses; the 
remainder are self-employed in occupations like taxi driving and hairdressing. 
The economic situation in these communities has evolved, and continues to evolve, at a rapid pace. In 
the decades following World War II, the area was central to Ghana’s cocoa industry, but over time this 
industry has declined. In the early to mid 1990s, the area was the epicenter of Ghana’s nascent export 
pineapple industry. Through the late 1990s and early 2000s, the export industry boomed, migrants came 
to the communities to work in the fields, and in the case of at least one of the communities, almost 
everyone was involved in pineapple cultivation in some way (Fold and Gough 2008). However, a rapid 
change in market conditions in Europe around 2005 dramatically cut demand for Ghanaian pineapples. 
Between 2005 and 2009 many farmers in the study area abandoned pineapple cultivation and, in some 
cases, migrated out of the community. Since contracts were often made by word-of-mouth, farmers had 
no guarantee of payment by the buying companies. Payments were often made months after delivery 
(Fold and Gough 2008, pp. 1692-93). Accordingly, there are numerous cases in our data of farmers 
reporting large contract defaults, with amounts unpaid sometimes running into the thousands of dollars. 
In the years since 2005 the people in the study area have moved on to other investments, or adapted to 
the new export market conditions. Anecdotally, however, the shock had a significant impact on the 
welfare of the community. In the analysis below, we will examine how households coped with this and 
other others they faced in the decade prior to 2009. 
Another recent economic change has been the encroachment of urban areas. In two of the 
communities, nearby town centers have expanded, and demand for rented housing and (in the case of 
one community) land for housing has pushed up the price of land. This, too, has caused a shift in the 
pattern of land usage, with some farmers in that community selling almost all of their land and shifting 
to wage work or semi-retirement. 5 
 
Aside from these shocks, the community members reported in pre-survey meetings and post-survey 
focus group interviews that there were no significant common shocks during the last decade. 
Agricultural conditions have been within the normal range of fluctuation, and the political situation has 
been stable (with only one peaceful change of government, in 2009). There have been no notable 
outbreaks of disease among individuals, livestock or crops, although cases of malaria, dysentery and 
other ailments remain common. 
Although the district has been occupied by a single ethnic group, the Akwapim, for over 200 years, 
migration is commonplace. Individuals migrate to towns and cities in search of work, or to join their 
spouse’s family after marriage, and a number of households reported holding land in different regions of 
Ghana. In our sample, around 17 percent of respondents had migrated from another region to live 
permanently in the study area. Since land is held in family and clan lineages, and land sales are rare, 
migrants typically rent land for farming.  
Since most households do not satisfy the criteria to access formal lending sources or insurance, 
individuals rely on their own savings, and on each other, to cope with shocks (Walker 2011). There are 
two main sources of support used by community members: family and friendship networks, and mutual 
assistance groups. We will briefly describe these in turn – first, the structure of the household and 
patterns of exchange therein, and second, the main sources of support from other households. 
Families in the district are interdependent and exchange gifts and loans in order to help cope with 
shocks. Individuals live in compounds, a conglomerate of houses containing more than one household 
(typically linked by kinship). A few men continue to practice traditional polygamy, with each wife and 
her descendants usually living separately. For the purposes of this study, we treat such families as one 
household unit. 
It is traditional in the study area for men to be the main breadwinners and to be responsible for covering 
the cost of food and household supplies. However, men and women often maintain separate finances. 
Previous research has established that spouses do not fully share information on their farming activities 
or earnings (Goldstein et al. 2002). Reflecting this, they do not appear to fully insure each other against 
income shocks. Using earlier household survey data from these communities, Goldstein (1999) was able 
to reject risk-sharing at the intrahousehold level. In part, this may be due to the relative rarity of large 
shocks idiosyncratic to just one spouse. For large shocks, individuals often turn to their extended family 
and friends for support. 
Informal and religious groups are common in the study communities, and these groups play a 
substantial role in the system of informal support. Foremost, a majority of individuals actively attend 
religious ceremonies, at churches or mosques. Religions are diverse in the communities and there is 
widespread tolerance between religions. Individual religious groups have strong ethics of sharing and 
mutual support, typically extending aid to families in need and raising funds from community members 
for charity within the village and elsewhere. 
Individuals are also commonly involved in farmers’ groups or other support groups, which may provide 
assistance to those in need in the form of labor, finance or training. Of our respondents, 45 percent 6 
 
reported being a member of at least one support group of any sort, and 18 percent a member of a 
church group. Individuals in our study reported joining such groups in search of assistance, and reported 
receiving help from these networks in times of need. Such groups may also form the basis of friendship 
links that are used for mutual insurance. Indeed, while Goldstein (1999) was able to reject the 
hypothesis of intrahousehold insurance in these communities, he was unable to reject the hypothesis of 
risk sharing between village members of the same gender, suggesting that gender-specific groups may 
be operating effectively as coinsurance networks. 
Data 
Our data were collected in the Akwapim South District in rural Eastern Ghana and cover the period 
between 1998 and 2009. The first wave of the panel was collected in 1997-98. For the 2009 wave we 
revisited as many of the original 213 households as possible. A substantial number of these households 
no longer existed. And for those that did the data do not contain all necessary variable for both years. 
Our final panel includes 127 households. 
The dataset we use in this paper summarizes data at the household level. The 2009 wave was 
administered in five rounds. Where appropriate we average values over the five rounds, for example, in 
compiling the consumption data. 
Consumption aggregates were constructed by household and then divided by household size in per 
adult equivalents. Household consumption includes all expenditures other than a set of lumpy items or 
items that do not contribute to the level of well-being including health expenditures, purchases of 
financial assets, marriage and dowry expenses, purchases of furniture, appliances, mobile phones, 
bicycles, motor vehicles, as well as court fees, gifts and transfers, funeral and birthday expenses and 
house and land rents. All monthly household expenditures as well as the assets expressed in currency 
were deflated by the CPI and converted into 2009 Ghanaian Cedi.  
Table 1 Household expenditure per adult equivalent (2009 Cedi and US$) 
  1998  2009 
Cedi  US$  Cedi  US$ 
per month  per day  per month  per day 
Darmang  55.49  38.27  1.28  58.11  40.08  1.34 
Pokrom  64.33  44.37  1.48  54.53  37.61  1.25 
Oboadaka  54.75  37.76  1.26  53.15  36.66  1.22 
Konkunuru  63.21  43.59  1.45  68.95  47.55  1.59 
All villages  59.23  40.85  1.36  58.92  40.63  1.35 
 
Table 1 shows that for the villages as a whole expenditure levels have remained almost constant 
between 1998 and 2009 at around 59 Cedi. Levels of expenditure are low at an average of $1.35 per 
adult equivalent per day at 2009 prices. Underlying this overall stagnant trend are divergent patterns 
across villages. Expenditure levels rose in Darmang and Konkonuru whereas they fell in substantially in 
Pokrom and slightly in Oboadaka. This pattern likely reflects the fact that Konkunuru and Darmang are 7 
 
characterized by more dynamic economies with better infrastructure and that these two villages have 
moved out of agriculture and become more urbanized over the study period. 
The empirical distributions in Figure 1 for household expenditure per adult equivalent for the whole 
sample show a right-ward shift between 1998 and 2009. This suggests a slight improvement in 
expenditure levels which seemingly contradicts the figure in Table 1. However, the averages in Table 1 
are partly driven by a few large outliers. For example, if we take out the three richest households that 
have per monthly adult equivalent expenditure greater than 300 Cedis out of the sample then average 
expenditure levels for the remaining households increased from 54.1 Cedis in 1998 to 57.8 Cedis in 
2009. 
Figure 1 Kernel density of expenditure 
 
The empirical analysis below includes a number of household level control variables. The age and sex of 
the household head control for lifecycle and gender effects. Whether the respondent or his/her parents 
have held a village office, whether the respondent is the first in the family to live in the village and 
whether he/she had previously been in foster care act as a proxy for the social status in the village and 
for the strength of social networks over and above the degree of social visibility discussed below. 
To examine the role of different sources of idiosyncratic risk on household welfare dynamics we 
designed the shocks module of the 2009 survey to ask for detailed recall information on the frequency 
and the monetary value of 20 negative and 9 positive shocks that have affected the household since the 
first wave of the panel in 1998. This creates a large number of variables. For instance, for the typical 
household with two respondents and 12 years of recall information we have 2*(20+9)*12 = 696 
variables each for the number of shocks and the value of these shocks. To keep the analysis tractable we 
first summed shocks within each household from all respondents in that household. Second, we 
combined them in across time by aggregating shocks across all 12 years. Third, we created summary 
shock variables for three categories of negative and two categories of positive shocks as described in the 
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experienced and for their total value for each of time period. Our analysis below begins by using these 
aggregate shocks before disaggregating by category of shock. 
 Table 2 Categorization of negative and positive shocks 
  Family/Personal  Business/Job  Agriculture/Livestock 
Negative 
shocks 
death of the household head or 
spouse, death of a household 
member, illness of injury o a 
household member, medical 
expenses, loss of home, divorce or 
separation, funeral expenses, 
division of property, cut-off of 
remittances, withdrawal of 
government or NGO assistance 
Loss of regular job, loss 





Crop loss due to 
drought, crop loss 
due to disease, crop 
loss due to other 
reasons, livestock 
loss due to death, 




New or increased remittances, 
inheritance, large gift or lottery 
win, receipt of dowry or brideprice, 
scholarship for child’s education, 
new government or NGO program 
New regular job for 
household member, 
young person worked, 




Table 3 gives an overview of the aggregate value and number of negative and positive shocks for 
households over the period spanned by the panel. Positive shocks were very rare with family and 
business shocks about equally frequent. The overall number of positive shocks per household over the 
12 year period was only 0.18. The value of positive shocks was also very small with an average total of 
134 Cedi per household which is only slightly more than the average monthly consumption level of two 
adult equivalents. 
Negative shocks were more frequent as well as larger. On average every third household suffered from 
an agricultural or livestock shock. These types of shocks were also smallest in magnitude with a size 
equal to the monthly per adult equivalent consumption level. Two thirds of households experienced a 
family shock. Moreover, the average size of the shock was almost six times as large as the agricultural 
shocks. The frequency of business shocks fell in between the two other shock categories but their value 
was largest of the three categories at an average of 490 Cedi. Combining all three negative shock 
categories households suffered on average 1.39 shocks with an average aggregate value of 877 Cedis 
which is about 15 months worth of average per adult equivalent consumption. This translates to around 
US$600 at 2009 prices. 
Table 3 Value and Number of negative household level shocks 1998-2009 
   Value of Shocks (in 2009 Cedi)  Number of Shocks 
Mean  Standard deviation  Mean  Standard deviation 
Negative Shocks             
All household shocks  877  2625  1.39  2.18 
Family shocks  329  1332  0.65  1.21 
Business shocks  490  2024  0.42  0.94 9 
 
Agricultural and Livestock 
shocks  58  233  0.32  0.88 
Positive Shocks             
All household shocks  134  1036  0.18  0.63 
Family shocks  70  684  0.08  0.36 
Business shocks  64  784  0.1  0.41 
 
The dataset also contains information on different risk management strategies: social networks, self-
insurance, access to loans in an emergency, and income diversification. 
To capture the effect of the size of respondents’ social networks, or their ‘social visibility’ we summarize 
each individual’s linkages with other survey respondents into an index. In the 1998 survey respondents 
were presented with seven individuals from the same villages that were randomly drawn without 
replacement. Respondents then indicated whether they know these random matches.
1 The aggregate of 
these responses, therefore, contain information on both directions of links between individuals. The 
random sampling of matches makes the identified links representative of a respondent’s extant social 
links. However, a potential drawback of random sampling is that we might not reliably capture the size 
of individuals’ social networks.  
The methodology for collecting the social links that form the basis of our social visibility indices differs 
between 1998 and 2009. In contrast to the random matching of seven individuals in the 1998 survey the 
2009 instrument contains a full census of all social linkages between all respondents in a village. To 
eliminate differences created by the data collection method that may have exaggerated any prospective 
change in network sizes over time we rescale the 1998 data by multiplying all 1998 measures by the 
ratio of the mean of the 2009 and the mean 1998 social visibility index. This also helps to more 
accurately proxy the size of individuals’ social networks in 1998. Even if we don’t want to make the 
strong assumption that mean network size (measured as number of connections) is unchanged over 
time this still offers a useful approach. This is because our transformation of the 1998 data preserves 
both the ordering of and the proportional distance between network size measures in the 1998 
observations. The transformed location of that distribution is arbitrary, but its scale and spread is 
preserved as is the continuous nature of our social visibility indices. 
We used the survey responses to the social network questions to measure an individual’s social network 
in two ways. The first method follows Vanderpuye-Orgle and Barrett (2009 ADR) and derives a social 
visibility index using uni-directional links from all respondents to an individual to calculate the 
proportion of respondents who know an individual when presented as a random match. 
Let J be the total number of respondents who were presented with individual i as a random match. Let 
Kij denote an indicator variable equal to one if respondent j knows individual i and zero otherwise. Then, 
the one directional social visibility index based on random matches, D1, can be expressed as  
                                                           
1 The survey made the distinction between actually knowing a person and knowing of a person using the Akan 
translation of “having heard of a person”. 10 
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Secondly, one can measure social visibility in the other direction, namely the proportion of the matches 
a respondent knew. Let     be an indicator variable equal to one if respondent i knows a presented 
random match and let L be the number of matches an individual was presented with. For 1998 L equals 
7, for 2009 L is equal to the total population in the village. Then this index takes the form 
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Another mechanism to insure against risk is to accumulate own savings. We proxy this ability to self-
insure by the total amount of the financial savings a household has accumulated. These include funds in 
susu, money owed by others, deposits in bank accounts and holdings of stocks, valuables and currency. 
Access to loans in an emergency represents another potential mechanism to cope with negative shocks 
ex post. This mechanism was captured by asking respondents whether and how they could obtain a loan 
of 50 Cedi within a week. 
Income diversification provides another mechanism of coping with risk ex ante and ex post. We would 
expect households with constrained access to other insurance mechanism to rely on a greater diversity 
of income sources. We measure livelihood diversification in two ways. First, we construct a continuous 
livelihood diversification index based on the shares of income from five sources: wage income from 
working for someone else, profits from non-farm businesses, profits from the farm in the village, profits 
from farms outside the village, and other incomes such as pensions, gift or inheritances, lottery winnings 
or sales of land. These shares are summarized into a Herfindahl index of income diversification. Let N 
denote the total number of i income sources and si stand for the share of income source i in total 
household income. Then the index takes the form 
        
 
 
   
 
This index is bounded by zero and one and a smaller value of the index implies a higher degree of 
income diversification.  
The second way we model income diversification is through the total number of household income 
sources. This total number is made up from farm sector diversification represented by the number of 
crops sold, non-farm diversification indicating the number of non-farm income sources, the number of 
sources of labor income, income sources from outside the village and any other sources of income. 
The degree of income diversification affects the extent to which a household can self-insurance against 
bad risk. However, greater diversification does not imply that a household is more likely to participate in 
higher-return non-farm activities. The continuous nature of the index also means that we don’t need to 
assign households into different diversification categories. Instead we can use it to construct interaction 
variables with other insurance mechanisms and with shocks.  11 
 
 
Results:  welfare dynamics 1998 – 2009 
Figure 2 plots household expenditure per adult equivalent on the vertical axis against its twelve-year 
lagged value on the horizontal axis. The observations are relatively evenly distributed on either side of 
the 45 degree line. There are slightly more observations in the bottom right part than in the top left part 
of figure 2. This reflects that at the top end of the distribution negative changes in expenditure were 
slightly larger than positive changes between 1998 and 2009. In any case the scatterplot in figure 2 
shows no immediately discernible welfare dynamics pattern and presents a priori evidence against 
nonlinear welfare dynamics and multiple dynamic equilibria.  
Figure 2 Household expenditure 2009 vs. 1998 
 
 
The whole sample 
Table 4 summarizes the results for the AR(1) regressions of the whole sample. The parametric models as 
well as for the nonparametric and the semiparametric regressions all suggest a single stable dynamic 
equilibrium for household expenditure for these rural Ghanaian households. The predicted long-term 
equilibrium levels of expenditure are low at between 45 and 50 Cedis per adult equivalent per month. 
Table 4 Welfare equilibria - whole sample 
    Location of  Stable 
Expenditure Equilibrium 
(in 2009 Cedi per adult 
equivalent)  
Nonparametric Regression     
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The estimated recursion diagrams in Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 5 show graphical representations of 
the results from Table 4. The central line displays the estimated welfare dynamics path. Its nearly linear 
shape suggests that we don’t need to model welfare dynamics in a fully flexible manner.  
Figure 3 Welfare Dynamics - Nonparametric penalized spline 
 
Figure 4 Welfare dynamics - Parametric regression 13 
 
 
Figure 5 Welfare dynamics - semiparametric penalized spline 
 
Disaggregating results by different types of heterogeneity 
Disaggregating the results by subgroup shows some clear differences in the equilibrium expenditure 
levels. However, hardly any of the differences in equilibria in Table 5 are statistically significant. Most 
likely this is due to the very small sample sizes of the subgroups. 
Among the villages more urbanized and more dynamic Darmang and Konkonuru have higher equilibria 
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Table 5 Welfare Equilibria - by subgroup 
  Number of observations   Location of  Stable Expenditure Equilibrium 
 (in 2009 per adult equivalent) 
By Village     
  Darmang  37  45 
  Konkonuru  27  50 
  Oboadaka  31  32 
  Pokrom  32  42 
By Social Visibility     
  Low (D mean < 0.68)  48  52 
  High(D mean > 0.68)  79  48 
By Credit Access     
  Can get GHC50 loan  110  43 
  Can’t get GHC50 loan  16  32 
By self insurance     
  HH Savings < US$500 PPP  39  42 
  HH Savings > US$500 PPP  88  44 
By occupation type     
  Pineapple farming HHs  17  38 
  Other farming HHs  76  43 
  Non-farm HHs  30  35-90 
By Income diversification     
  Herfindahl < 0.8  70  44 
  Herfindahl > 0.8  57  52 
  Fewer than 2 income sources  74  35 
  2 or more income sources  53  65 
 
The size of one’s social network appears to have little impact on the location of the expenditure 
equilibrium. If anything a higher average social visibility index of household heads and spouses seems to 
be related to (statistically insignificantly) lower predicted expenditure.  
The ability to access credit seems to affect projected expenditure levels as expected. Households that 
claim to be able to get a 50 Cedis loan with a week are expected to be slightly better off than 
households who could not get a loan. Again, the differences are not statistically significant which is not 
surprising given the small sample size. 
Self-insurance in the form of own savings appears to be mildly positively related with well-being. 
Households with financial savings larger than $500 PPP at 1993 prices have an equilibrium expenditure 
level of 44 vs. 42 for households with smaller savings.  
There are some differences in welfare equilibria by type of employment. Pineapple farmers are 
expected to be slightly worse off than other farming households. During the late 1990s the opposite was 
true as pineapple farmers benefited from the export boom. However, in 2004/05 pineapple growers’ 15 
 
fortunes started to reverse as demand for Ghanaian pineapples plummeted as consumers in Europe 
began favoring different varieties grown predominantly in Latin America. The demand shock for 
pineapples had fully affected respondents by the time of our 2009 survey. Non-farm households are 
characterized by a high degree of heterogeneity in livelihood activities ranging from unskilled labor and 
subsistence farmers to steady formal sector employment. This heterogeneity is reflected in the large 
range of predicted expenditure levels of between 35 and 90 Cedis per adult equivalent per month. 
Income diversification appears to have a subtle overall effect on households’ predicted long-term 
expenditure. Households whose Herfindahl index of income shares lies below 0.8, that is, households 
that have more diversified income shares, have a projected equilibrium of 44 Cedi compared to 52 Cedi 
for households with Herfindahl indices larger than 0.8.  
We find the opposite effect if we express income diversification in terms of the simple number of 
income sources. Households with fewer than two incomes sources have an expected per adult 
equivalent expenditure of 35 which is only roughly half the level that households with two or more 
income sources enjoy. A priori there is no reason to believe that income diversification would 
necessarily lead to greater well-being. Indeed, in principle households with a single income source 
whether in the form of a government job or highly specialized contract farming such as pineapples could 
enjoy the highest returns and levels of well-being. But that would only hold either in the absence of risk 
or with risk and high levels of insurance. The fact that households with a larger number of income 
sources appear to be better off points towards the presence of risk and the even the whole range of 
existing insurance mechanisms being incomplete. 
Stratifying the sample by expenditure levels we observe large differences in expenditure equilibria 
across the distribution. Table 6 shows the corresponding estimates from a parametric quantile 
regression. The 75
th percentile has a substantially higher predicted expenditure level than the median 
with 69 Cedi vs. 38 Cedi. The 25
th and 10
th percentile are correspondingly lower again at 26 and 20 Cedis, 
respectively. 
 
Table 6 Welfare equilibria - by quantiles 
  Number of observations   Location of  Stable Expenditure Equilibrium 
 (in 2009 Cedi per adult equivalent) 
All Shocks (1998-2009)     
  75
th percentile  127  69 
  Median  127  38 
  25
th percentile  127  26 
  10
th percentile  127  20 
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Results: The effect of idiosyncratic shocks and interactions shocks and risk 
management mechanisms 
Idiosyncratic shocks have a negative effect on household expenditure levels. This result is robust across 
different time lags and for different types of shocks. The first column in Table 7 summarizes the 
regression results for shocks that occurred at any time during the panel period 1997-2009. The detailed 
regression output is given Table 8. The negative effect on household expenditure levels is statistically 
significant for all shocks and for agricultural and livestock shocks. 
Table 7 Negative shocks and welfare & interactions between negative shocks and insurance mechanisms 
  Shock  Shock Interaction terms 







# of income sources 
All shocks  -*  +  +**  +*  - 
Family shocks  -  +  +**  +  - 
Business shocks  -  +  -  -  + 
Agriculture and 
livestock shocks 
-**  +  +  +*  - 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
To examine the effectiveness of the different insurance mechanisms on mitigating negative shocks we 
need to look at the interactions between shocks and the risk management strategies. These interactions 
are summarized in columns 2-5 in Table 7. 
The positive signs in column 2 suggest that access to credit helps mitigate the negative effect of all types 
of shocks. However, none of these effects are statistically significant. This could reflect the small sample 
or the relatively small average effect of shocks on 12-year welfare dynamics and the small effect of 
insurance mechanisms to protect households’ well-being. It could also be because of the loan amount 
that was asked about in the survey (50 Cedi) was relatively small compared the size of household 
shocks. Thus, households who could only barely get 50 Cedi would register as ‘having access to credit’ 
but the amount of credit was insufficient to overcome the shock. 
Self-insurance in the form of household savings also helps to reduce the impact of negative shocks. This 
effect is statistically significant at the 5% level for all shocks and for family shocks even in this small 
sample. Household savings appear to be insufficient to mitigate the effect of negative business shocks. 
This may be because, although less frequent, business shocks are on average the largest shocks a 
household experiences often caused by failing businesses and unfulfilled contracts in the pineapple 
industry. 
The degree of social visibility has a positive and statistically significant effect on mitigating negative 
household shocks for shocks overall and for agricultural and livestock shocks. The effect is also positive 
but not statistically significant for family shocks. And as for self-insurance, social networks do not seem 
to be strong enough to help overcome large business shocks. Though again, this effect is not statistically 
significant.  17 
 
The effect of income diversification on mitigating shocks is in the opposite direction to the effect of 
household savings and social visibility. Theoretically it could go either way depending on the root cause 
for diversification. If diversification primarily functions as an insurance strategy then we should expect a 
positive effect on mitigating shocks. However, income diversification could also be a reflection of 
households pursuing multiple low return activities rather than specializing in fewer higher return 
endeavors. In such a situation the negative effect makes sense: more diversified households get lower 
returns than less diversified households and therefore are less able to weather shocks. This is the 
pattern we observe for shocks as a whole and for family and agricultural shocks. The one exception is 
again with respect to business shocks. The positive effect of the number of income sources on mitigating 
the impact of business shocks could reflect the fact that households operating a business use income 
diversification primarily as an insurance mechanisms for when their main business income falls short.   
 
Table 8 Parametric Regression Results – Interaction of shocks and insurance mechanisms 
Interaction Shocks & Mechansims. Value of Shocks. All years. 
Dependent Variable: Change in Expenditure per adult equivalent 1997-2009 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  All shocks. 
Herfindahl 
All shocks. # 
income 
sources 
By shock type. 
Herfindahl 
By shock type. 
# income 
sources 
         
monthly HH expenditure 2009 Cedis per adult equivalent lagged 
one time period 
-0.922  -0.683  -0.992  -0.686 
  (0.277)  (0.392)  (0.258)  (0.414) 
lagged monthly HH expenditure 2009 Cedis per adult equivalent 
squared 
0.00638  0.00254  0.00759  0.00273 
  (0.655)  (0.851)  (0.592)  (0.846) 
lagged monthly HH expenditure 2009 Cedis per adult equivalent 
cubed 
-5.01e-05  -2.79e-05  -6.10e-05  -3.27e-05 
  (0.519)  (0.704)  (0.423)  (0.674) 
lagged monthly HH expenditure 2009 Cedis per adult equivalent 
quartic 
7.52e-08  4.64e-08  1.04e-07  6.23e-08 
  (0.493)  (0.656)  (0.345)  (0.579) 
total value of family/personal/social shocks      -0.0607  -0.0564 
      (0.224)  (0.276) 
value_family_all12_sq      -5.63e-07**  -4.00e-07 
      (0.0246)  (0.109) 
total value of business/job shocks      -0.0158  -0.0141 
      (0.542)  (0.478) 
value_business_all12_sq      4.11e-07**  2.12e-07* 
      (0.0177)  (0.0753) 
total value of agriculture/livestock shocks      -0.0717**  -0.0761** 
      (0.0399)  (0.0177) 
value_ag_all12_sq      1.55e-05  1.89e-05 
      (0.407)  (0.259) 
mean visibility index - proportion of time individual presented as 
random match 
75.91  76.16  91.92  85.50 
  (0.196)  (0.156)  (0.151)  (0.155) 
vis_count1_sq  -106.7**  -95.20**  -119.4*  -109.3* 
  (0.0417)  (0.0457)  (0.0566)  (0.0590) 18 
 
vis_count1_value_fam_all12      0.00730  0.0151 
      (0.645)  (0.385) 
vis_count1_value_bus_all12      -9.04e-05  -0.00772 
      (0.990)  (0.315) 
vis_count1_value_ag_all12      0.0568*  0.0376* 
      (0.0573)  (0.0807) 
can get GHC50 in a week - at least one HH respondent  -32.03  -40.74**  -35.29  -44.17* 
  (0.127)  (0.0496)  (0.150)  (0.0759) 
insuremergency_value_fam_all12      0.0489  0.0501 
      (0.302)  (0.303) 
insuremergency_value_bus_all12      0.0210  0.0173 
      (0.366)  (0.373) 
insuremergency_value_ag_all12      0.0317  0.0347 
      (0.290)  (0.200) 
value of financial savings in 1993 PPP$  0.00736*  0.00941**  0.00582  0.00860 
  (0.0861)  (0.0239)  (0.296)  (0.122) 
selfinsure_93dollar_sq  -2.15e-07  -3.11e-07**  -1.70e-07  -2.80e-07 
  (0.151)  (0.0369)  (0.378)  (0.148) 
selfinsure_93do_value_fam_all12      3.39e-06**  1.52e-06 
      (0.0319)  (0.305) 
selfinsure_93do_value_bus_all12      -4.19e-06  -3.38e-06** 
      (0.116)  (0.0111) 
selfinsure_93do_value_ag_all12      6.01e-06  3.17e-06 
      (0.534)  (0.758) 
income diversification - Herfindahl index - average of HH 
respondents 
8.825    13.18   
  (0.377)    (0.383)   
Herfindahl_value_fam_all12      0.0116*   
      (0.0791)   
Herfindahl_value_bus_all12      -0.00943   
      (0.171)   
Herfindahl_value_ag_all12      -0.0494   
      (0.239)   
Age in years  -0.521  -0.822*  -0.430  -0.797 
  (0.270)  (0.0777)  (0.416)  (0.118) 
squared age  -0.0182  -0.00613  -0.0309  -0.0166 
  (0.330)  (0.728)  (0.165)  (0.421) 
highest grade HH head  0.397  -0.133  0.0676  0.00663 
  (0.784)  (0.924)  (0.965)  (0.997) 
squared highest grade HH head  0.538  0.561  0.401  0.508 
  (0.185)  (0.187)  (0.398)  (0.284) 
occupation type HH head  7.636  5.479  9.302  7.785 
  (0.199)  (0.312)  (0.147)  (0.220) 
fostered HH head  -6.028  -4.157  -5.029  -3.205 
  (0.354)  (0.509)  (0.429)  (0.615) 
HH head in village for longer  15.65  16.96  14.22  19.44 
  (0.133)  (0.105)  (0.211)  (0.110) 
HH head's mother held village office  5.748  12.54*  8.295  8.368 
  (0.400)  (0.0770)  (0.396)  (0.356) 
HH head's father held village office  -4.322  -1.436  -1.057  1.861 
  (0.564)  (0.848)  (0.898)  (0.835) 
HH head holds village office  12.78  12.02*  12.46  11.99 
  (0.107)  (0.0950)  (0.153)  (0.129) 
year==  2009.0000  0  0  0  0 
  ()  ()  ()  () 
village==     Pokrom  -2.863  -3.214  0.393  -5.856 19 
 
  (0.804)  (0.763)  (0.974)  (0.609) 
village==     Oboadaka  -21.89**  -27.22***  -20.63*  -25.54** 
  (0.0355)  (0.00720)  (0.0532)  (0.0174) 
village==     Konkunuru  -8.287  -0.994  -8.040  -1.370 
  (0.413)  (0.916)  (0.421)  (0.885) 
total value of all negative shocks  -0.0359*  -0.0307*     
  (0.0520)  (0.0818)     
value_all_all12_sq  -7.34e-08  -2.00e-08     
  (0.364)  (0.807)     
vis_count1_value_all_all12  0.00573*  0.00411     
  (0.0796)  (0.231)     
insuremergency_value_all_all12  0.0277  0.0274     
  (0.124)  (0.109)     
selfinsure_93do_value_all_all12  1.23e-06**  1.66e-07     
  (0.0423)  (0.754)     
Herfindahl_value_all_all12  0.00296       
  (0.148)       
number of income sources - average of HH respondents    10.77***    10.98*** 
    (0.00149)    (0.00842) 
numincsources_value_all_all12    -0.000327     
    (0.379)     
numincsources_value_fam_all12        -0.000765 
        (0.528) 
numincsources_value_bus_all12        0.00134 
        (0.145) 
numincsources_value_ag_all12        -0.00885 
        (0.356) 
Constant  49.96  35.22  48.07  37.68 
  (0.139)  (0.282)  (0.194)  (0.322) 
         
Observations  126  126  126  126 
R-squared  0.746  0.766  0.775  0.791 
Robust p-values in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Conclusions 
Risk and uncertainty diminish the current level of economic well-being as well as prospects for the 
future. This is particularly true when livelihood generating activities are highly stochastic, as they are for 
many rural households in developing countries, and when mechanisms to insure against risk are either 
non-existent or insufficient. While households face two distinct sources of risk, covariate and 
idiosyncratic, the latter often dominates and requires different strategies to mitigate.  
In this paper we examined the importance of idiosyncratic risk for households in rural Ghana and 
examined the effectiveness of various risk management strategies in mitigating this risk. The households 
in our survey have experienced slight improvements in their economic well-being between 1998 and 
2009. However, they remain poor with an average expenditure level per adult equivalent of 59 Cedis or 
$1.35 in 2009 prices. Their estimated long-term future level of well-being is of similar magnitude. 
Households in the two villages with better access to markets and outside labor opportunities fare 
considerably better than those in the two more remote communities. 20 
 
In addition to being poor the survey households face considerable exposure to negative idiosyncratic 
shocks with the average household losing close to 900 Cedis due to family, business and agriculture and 
livestock shocks during 1997-2009. Having experienced a shock is strongly related to lower growth in 
consumption. 
Households use a variety of mechanisms to try to prevent and deal with negative shocks including 
support from social networks, self-insurance in the form of savings, accessing credit and diversifying 
livelihood activities. Our results suggest varying degrees of effectiveness for these mechanisms. Having 
own savings and being able to draw on larger social networks offers a statistically significantly better 
chance of overcoming the consequences of negative shocks. Credit access also seems to help though the 
evidence is less strong. A greater diversity of income sources is associated with greater gains in 
expenditure but income diversification does not seem to help in overcoming shocks. This could be a 
reflection of many households diversifying into low-return activities that are positively correlated. 
Overall our results suggest some effectiveness of these formal and informal insurance mechanisms. 
However, even in their combination they are not sufficient in helping households overcome negative 
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